India’s China anxiety

If you look at the regional environment of South Asia at the moment, one thing is clear: India is attempting to imitate China’s approach to asserting great power status. India’s recent military aggression towards Pakistan can largely be attributed to two strategic objectives.

First, India has consistently sought to establish itself as the regional hegemon in South Asia, using military posturing and cross-border actions to assert dominance, particularly over Pakistan. Second, India views the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) as a threat to its geopolitical and economic ambitions. By attempting to destabilise the region, especially areas linked to CPEC, India aims to undermine the project and position itself as a viable alternative to China in terms of regional infrastructure leadership and global partnerships. These motives reflect a broader ambition not just to counter Pakistan, but to project India as a central power in an emerging multipolar global order.

However, India differs significantly from China, as it remains deeply entangled in regional conflicts. These tensions involve Pakistan, Bangladesh, China and, at times, Nepal. Persistent border disputes and water-sharing disagreements have strained its relations with these neighbours and India’s desire to project power in the region often clashes with the sovereignty concerns of smaller neighbouring states. Unlike China’s relatively stable regional diplomacy, India’s assertive policies tend to generate unease across South Asia.

India’s growing apprehension about CPEC reflects its anxiety over losing strategic influence in the region. CPEC strengthens Pakistan’s economy and infrastructure and enhances its strategic importance, challenging India’s ambitions for regional dominance. India also perceives the growing China-Pakistan nexus as a threat to its leadership role in South Asia and its maritime access to the Arabian Sea. This perception has prompted India to distance itself from the Belt and Road Initiative and support alternative connectivity projects such as the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), a strategic effort to counterbalance and reduce China’s regional influence.

The geopolitical landscape of South Asia has undergone significant transformation since the launch of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Linking China’s Xinjiang province to Pakistan’s Gwadar Port, the corridor strategically passes through Gilgit-Baltistan – a region India controversially claims as part of its territory. As a result, India has persistently opposed the Chinese-led CPEC. Over time, its objections have evolved from diplomatic and economic resistance to more overt militarised actions, exemplified by aerial strikes such as the Balakot operation in 2019 and again in May 2025. These actions also show clearly India’s enduring hostility towards Pakistan and reflect a broader strategic rivalry with China.

Under the guise of counterterrorism, India’s military actions against Pakistan reveal deeper strategic anxieties, particularly concerning CPEC’s growing influence. The Pulwama-Balakot episode of February 2019 marked a shift in India’s military doctrine, showcasing a willingness to use force preemptively based on contested intelligence. Following a suicide bombing in Pulwama, India launched airstrikes on Pakistan, again attempting to justify the attack as counterterrorism. However, the intensity of these strikes sent a broader strategic message, signalling India’s apprehension that China-Pakistan-led regional connectivity could undermine its influence and interests in South Asia.

India’s airstrikes coincided with growing domestic concern over CPEC’s increasing regional appeal, the successful completion of Phase One, and progress toward Phase Two. Suffice it to say, New Delhi views CPEC as a threat, both as a means of strategic encirclement and as a challenge to its aspirations for regional dominance.

India sees CPEC as part of China’s broader ‘grand strategy’ to encircle it, embodied in the so-called ‘String of Pearls’ – a network of maritime bases and infrastructure projects across the Indian Ocean. India’s military posture towards Pakistan thus reflects a form of coercive diplomacy, signalling India’s readiness to respond forcefully to developments along CPEC’s route, particularly as China’s presence in Pakistan expands through infrastructure and economic investments. India fears that China’s growing foothold could provide it with direct access to the Arabian Sea, posing a threat to India’s commercial and naval interests. The increasing presence of Chinese personnel and facilities in Pakistan has only deepened these concerns.

A closer look at the Indian airstrikes of May 7, 2025, reveals they targeted areas such as Muzaffarabad, Kotli and Bahawalpur – regions closely associated with CPEC. While the strikes did not directly target CPEC infrastructure, the choice of locations sent a clear message: India is willing to use military force to assert its regional dominance. This show of strength was aimed not only at Pakistan but also at deterring foreign investors by portraying the CPEC corridor as unstable and insecure. In doing so, India seeks to undermine CPEC’s credibility and momentum while preserving its own strategic autonomy in an evolving regional order.

India’s militarised posture also reveals deeper anxieties about China’s expanding influence in South Asia and the perceived erosion of its own regional leadership. As China consolidates its economic footprint through CPEC, India sees its strategic space narrowing. The 2025 airstrikes, like those in 2019, appear to be less about immediate retaliation and more about preempting long-term shifts in the regional balance of power.

For Pakistan, India’s shift toward militarised responses to economic projects poses serious risks. By bypassing diplomatic engagement, New Delhi has raised the spectre of a destabilised region in which security concerns undermine economic cooperation. India’s combination of military actions, infrastructure posturing, and diplomatic opposition represents open resistance to CPEC. This response paints a precarious picture for states pursuing regional connectivity and economic stability.

The point though is that India’s attempts to assert regional hegemony – whether by emulating China’s strategic posture or through aerial strikes on Pakistan – have so far fallen short. Efforts to sabotage CPEC have failed and exposed India’s discomfort with shifting geopolitical realities. As the corridor advances, it strengthens the China-Pakistan partnership and increasingly sidelines India in the emerging regional order.

With unresolved border disputes, strained relations with neighbours, and an increasingly reactive foreign policy, India’s vision of regional supremacy appears increasingly out of reach. If such miscalculations persist, they risk damaging India’s image both regionally and globally.

The writer is an associate professor of international relations at the National University of Modern Languages, Islamabad.