It is difficult to understand and subsequently assimilate the real impact of the recent military encounter between Pakistan and India. Even harder is to anticipate India’s next move in an ever-changing South Asian politico-strategic landscape. Instead of ascertaining each other’s next moves, policy planners avoided prophesying and instead decided to send delegations to brief world capitals, perhaps to maintain a law-abiding appearance. Both countries are seemingly at a loss to know any other way to address the ongoing troubled predicament. For India, a lot is at stake as it struggles to claw back on its ‘shine’ and ‘rise’ with a visible black eye. On the other hand, the ‘victory’ has not only placed Pakistan at a higher techno-military pedestal but also exposed it to a few hitherto unknown winds of uncertainty. Preparedness has become a lot harder to fathom than it was before the war.
It is then no surprise that the post-war interregnum is both uneasy and uncertain. However, based on the nature and extent of animosity and the unconvincing desire to keep tensions high between the two countries at all costs, and in view of the regional and international environment, certain conclusions could be drawn:
Like many such unfortunate incidents, the Pahalgam question will remain unresolved and shrouded in mystery. Neither side will be able to either prove or disprove any worthwhile point. Two: The delegations sent by both countries will not produce any substantive results. Three: The Indus Waters Treaty may stay in limbo for a considerable period. Four: Under the circumstances, resuming composite dialogue, particularly on Kashmir, will be tantamount to political suicide for PM Modi and his ruling BJP. Bilateral talks and formal bilateral trade, thus, will remain a far cry. India’s persistent stance on holding talks only on terrorism may also fade away. Five: Regional and international powers would step back until the war bells started tolling again.
Regardless of the outcome of the Bihar Legislative Assembly elections, scheduled to be held in Oct–November this year, proxy wars, spy and hybrid warfare, and propaganda-based media wars are likely to intensify. With the Partition’s ghosts haunting the region again, the ideological warfare that gained prominence during the recent techno-military encounter is likely to deepen further. The war of words over each other’s credentials, the Indus Waters Treaty’s status, terrorism and Kashmir is likely to continue as well. Additionally, threatening statements from India will keep resonating with Pakistan’s peace postures and warnings against any aggression.
Now the real question. Is another war between the two South Asian laced-with-nuclear-arms arch-rivals in the offing?
As India will not risk its own annihilation, a total war or a nuclear war is not a possibility. In both cases, a lot will be at stake even for the major world powers. Imagine a nuclear war resulting in widespread radiation contamination and firestorms. Or in the case of a total war, imagine the global panic, massive refugee crises, and of course economic collapses. Hence, there are no chances of an all-out war, even if PM Modi loses all his remaining senses. As the idea is to see an unstable or compliant or a not-so-China-friendly Pakistan, the Indian mindset will remain focused on finding ways and means to embarrass and weaken its western neighbour. The recent ‘defeat’ at the hands of a much smaller country has added an element of ‘revenge’ to the erstwhile uneasy equation. That’s where the situation takes a dangerous turn.
Therefore, the worst-case scenario is a limited conventional war. In this likely scenario, both sides will suffer heavy military and economic losses, while major powers and the United Nations will rush to ensure an early ceasefire, as long-term instability in the region will affect all and sundry — both directly and vicariously. Subsequently, territorial adjustments will be made, with the possibility of imposing sanctions on one or both sides. For obvious reasons, such a war will hurt Pakistan more — particularly economically. No matter how long this war takes to end, there will be no decisive victory for either side.
India could afford a limited conventional war economically. However, besides facing long-term insurgencies and indigenously generated terrorist attacks in its occupied zones, the ongoing separatist movements might create fresh headaches for India. Above all, India might have to succumb to international pressure to resolve the Kashmir dispute — once and for all. The recent military encounter highlighted the Kashmir dispute — by default. The future war might pave the way for a UN-sponsored plebiscite in the entire disputed region — an Indian nightmare. It’s a vague possibility but still must be considered by New Delhi. In addition, India’s main parameters that shape its foreign policy will come under serious scrutiny — a diplomatic dent the country will find difficult to remove.
A word of caution for India: Pakistan seems to have proved its fighting skills and the ability to put in place another Bunyamum Marsoos beforehand. Its rapid striking ability inside the enemy’s territory might not let any conventional war last longer than a few hours.
All said and done, any future war will result in prolonged chaos affecting the region’s geopolitics and geoeconomics for decades. India knows this. Pakistan knows this. The world knows this. However, as humanity does not live in a purely Hobbesian world and swallowing pride and giving diplomacy a chance is not India’s preferred choice, the region is likely to remain geopolitically vulnerable unless India balances its pride with reason. To the chagrin of peace-loving segments on both sides of the fence, peaceful coexistence between the two countries will remain as elusive as the Rio Earth Summit’s goals for Sustainable Development.
Najm us Saqib
The writer is a former Ambassador of Pakistan and author of eight books in three languages. He can be reached at najmussaqib1960@msn.com
balancing-pride-reason
Najm us Saqib
2025-05-31 01:06:16
www.nation.com.pk