A dozen new normals

After a humiliating four-day rout by Pakistan, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi declared on May 12: “After surgical strikes and air strikes, Operation Sindoor now defines India’s new counter-terrorism policy. It has set a new benchmark – a new normal.”

This statement aimed to placate both critics and supporters. Earlier, Modi had unilaterally violated the Indus Waters Treaty and blamed Pakistan for the April 22 Pahalgam attack, triggering a war which ultimately ended decisively in Pakistan’s favour. Ironically, it was Pakistan that established the real ‘new normals’.

But what does ‘new normal’ mean in international politics? Used initially after the 2008 financial crisis and later during Covid-19, the term signifies lasting change following major disruptions. Historically, it dates back to the post–World War era, when global powers pursued peace as a new normal, with the UN as its custodian. Chinese President Xi Jinping described China’s new normal in 2014 as moderate growth, structural optimisation and innovation. Today, the term also reflects breakthrough shifts in technology, governance and society – markers of deep, systemic transformation.

Most uses of ‘new normal’ have been benign, but India under Modi has invoked it malignantly. His statement suggests India may strike Pakistan at will, using fabricated pretexts to further violent, extremist electoral politics and harm its neighbour. This dangerous precedent in interstate conduct carries self-destructive risks. If repeated, it could backfire disastrously. Ironically, Modi’s framing also implies that Pakistan has the right to retaliate inside India if it finds evidence of Indian involvement in any terrorist attack. The four-day war has established numerous new normals.

One, if India commits aggression, Pakistan will retaliate massively and punitively with full force, penetrating deep into India’s territory. If Pakistan’s very existence and sovereignty are put at risk, Pakistan’s response will be disproportionate.

Two, India has declared that any terrorist attack within minutes will be attributed to Pakistan and without waiting for any investigation and corroboration, it will attack Pakistan. Because of this, Pakistani forces will always be in a defensive-offensive mode, in a state of war.

Three, India would target civilians in Pakistan and call them terrorists to justify its aggression. Our civilian population will need to be perpetually ready for such contingencies.

Four, the myth of Indian military supremacy has been shattered. Pakistan has established its parity or preeminence in the conventional realm. Strategically, India and Pakistan are on par. Pakistan’s strategic planning, command and control, generalship, soldiery and overall morale were higher than India’s.

Five, the Pakistan-China dyad has proved its upper edge on the India-West combine in military technologies and platforms – fighter jets, missiles, drones, loitering munitions and tools of cyber warfare.

Six, hybrid warfare will dominate future conflicts, blending conventional and non-conventional tactics. For India and Pakistan, this means war could persist even in peacetime, with India launching attacks unpredictably. It will maintain ambiguity over its aggression across the Line of Control, working boundary or international border, and its role in cross-border terrorism from the west. Hybrid actors will be continuously deployed to sustain this persistent, boundary-blurring conflict.

Seven, the risk of nuclear war in South Asia is real. A conflict between India and Pakistan could trigger a global catastrophe – nuclear winter, crop failure, famine, mass deaths from radiation and starvation, and a worsened climate crisis. Major powers now recognise this threat as a potential apocalypse with worldwide consequences.

Eight, if an India-Pakistan war spirals into the nuclear realm, major powers would intercede to defuse the crisis and bring the two nations back from the precipice.

Nine, it has become clear that there will be no peace in South Asia without resolving the Jammu and Kashmir dispute. India’s policies to brutalise the state’s population and merge it into its federation have failed.

Ten, in diplomacy, mediation is widely practised. US President Donald Trump, foreseeing the consequences of the escalating war, intervened to broker a ceasefire. India agreed to, as US Secretary Marco Rubio put it, “start talks on a broad set of issues at a neutral site”. Now, after facing a backlash from his own party and opposition, Modi is trying to wriggle out of that commitment. In contrast, the US, the most powerful nation, and Iran are holding talks in Rome under the mediatory agency of Oman.

Eleven, narrativisation during war would have salience not just between combatants, as always, but in the international information domain. The recent India-Pakistan war demonstrated that the authenticity of narratives by traditional and new media will be fact-checked, and the side pedalling fake news and footage will lose.

Finally, India’s doctrines of Cold Start and surgical strikes have all been debunked. Its much-touted new normal is aspirational at best and a damp squib at worst.

The writer is a former ambassador of Pakistan to the US, UN and China.